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Pharmaceutical spending in many other countries has had a steep increase in the last decade.  The 
Portuguese Government has adopted several measures to reduce pharmaceutical expenditure 
growth, ranging from increased co-payments to price decreases determined administratively. 
Promotion of generic consumption has also ranked high in political priorities. 
We assess the overall impact of the several policy measures on total pharmaceutical 
spending, using monthly data over the period January 1995 – August 2008. Endogenous structural 
breaks (time-series) methods were employed.  
Our findings suggest that policy measures aimed at controlling pharmaceutical 
expenditure have been, in general, unsuccessful. Two breaks were identified. Both coincide with 
administratively determined price decreases. Measures aimed at increasing competition in the 
market had no visible effect on the dynamics of Government spending in pharmaceutical 
products. In particular, the introduction of reference pricing had only a transitory effect of less 
than one year, with historical growth resuming quickly. 
 The consequence of it is a transfer of financial burden from the Government to the 
patients, with no apparent effect on the dynamics of pharmaceutical spending. This strongly 
suggests that pharmaceutical companies have been able to adjust to policy measures, in order to 
sustain their sales. It remains a challenge for the future to identify firms’ strategies that supported 
continued growth of sales, despite the several policy measures adopted.  
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Growth in health expenditures is a concern in many countries. Pharmaceutical spending in several 
countries has had a steep increase in the last decade. Portugal was no exception to this general 
trend. The Portuguese Government has adopted a wide range of measures to reduce 
pharmaceutical expenditure growth, from increased co-payments to price decreases determined 
administratively. Promotion of generic consumption has also ranked high in political priorities. 
The concern with the growth of health expenditures is not specific to Portugal. Policy 
measures aiming at control of the growth rate of pharmaceutical expenditure can be found in most 
countries. On the demand side, we can find measures directed to patients’ behaviour and 
measures aimed at the medical profession. Examples of the former are the increasing role of 
copayments and of education programmes. On measures aimed at the medical profession, we find 
pharmaceutical budgets, protocols for prescription and promotion of generic drugs. Also on the 
supply side we can find extensive intervention, such as price controls, profit controls, entry 
controls (white lists and black lists), regulation of detailing and marketing and promotion of more 
competition.  The Portuguese Government has resorted to most of these measures, making this 
market a natural ground to look at their impact. To name three recent measures (since 2005) in 
the Portuguese market, we have the enactment of regulations promoting the use of generic drugs, 
the introduction of a reference pricing system (which was accompanied by a higher copayment by 
patients) and global agreement between the Government and the industry to limit the growth of 
public spending with pharmaceutical products.  
We assess what has been the impact of policy measures on the aggregate pharmaceutical 
consumption in Portugal over time. As the Portuguese National Health Service experimented with 
many of the policy measures also adopted in other countries, the results are of general interest. 
We are particularly interested in identifying which, if any, of the measures taken contributed to a 
change in the growth pattern of pharmaceutical consumption in Portugal. 
Mossialos et al (2006) provide an overview of the international experience and document 
that similar policy measures have been adopted in different countries.. Summarizing their 
assessment, we may say that most policies have no impact, or at the most only a temporary effect. 
This is true also of more aggressive measures such as direct price controls. The impact of price 
controls on drug expenditures has been mitigated by growth in quantities or changes in the mix of 
products, to include more expensive medicines. The “prescription” from Mossialos et al (2006) is 
to create the conditions for competition in the generics market and integrate price and 
reimbursement decisions for on-patent pharmaceutical products. Both have also been attempted in 
the Portuguese market. The reference pricing mechanism ranks high in this approach, though it is 
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not as broad as in Germany (where it brings into the same class patented and off-patent 
pharmaceutical products).  
In the UK, we have observed price cuts and a cap on margins (profits), in an agreement 
adopted in 2006. Administrative price cuts (across the board) and an agreement to control public 
expenditure growth were also used in Portugal in the period 2005-2007. 
The success of changes in copayments in controlling pharmaceutical expenditures, on the 
other hand, is far from being assured.  Sisto and Zanola (2005) unveil significant effects of co-
payments in determining slower growth in pharmaceutical expenditures in Italy. This result is 
further confirmed in Fiorio and Siciliani (2008), who look at the copayment changes on the 
demand for pharmaceutical prescriptions, taking advantage of regional variation introduced in 
2002. They find an economic effect from a co-payment increase (the patient pays more at the 
moment of consumption) but no effect from a slight copayment decrease.1 However, Lee et al. 
(2006), for Taiwan, have found that generic grouping was far more relevant than copayments. 
Our findings, using monthly data from January 1995 to August 2008, suggest that policy 
measures aimed at controlling pharmaceutical expenditure have been, in general, unsuccessful. 
The only two significant impacts (October 2005 and February 2007) are associated with 
administratively determined price decreases across the board. The change is essentially a level 
change as the underlying trend of the series seems to remain basically the same. Moreover, the 
impact is larger for Government pharmaceutical expenditure than for total expenditure. The 
consequence of it is a transfer of financial burden from the Government to the patients, with no 
apparent effect on the dynamics of pharmaceutical spending. This strongly suggests that 
pharmaceutical companies have been able to adjust to policy measures, in order to sustain their 
sales. It remains a challenge for the future to identify firms’ strategies that supported continued 
growth of sales, despite the several policy measures adopted.  
The paper is organized in the following way. Section 2 describes the institutional 
background of the market. Section 3 reports the data and presents a simple trend analysis. Then, 
Section 4 formally tests for endogenous structural breaks, and discusses the main findings. 
Finally, Section 5 concludes. 
 
2 The institutional background 
Consumption of pharmaceutical products has increased in Portugal, like in many other countries. 
Figure 1 presents the total pharmaceutical consumption relative to GDP for a set of OECD 
countries. Portugal has the second highest relative effort, just after Greece. Greece is a particular 
                                                 
1 Further description of the Italian situation can be found in Fattore e tal. (2008). 
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case, due to prevailing low prices. The relative high consumption of pharmaceutical products is, 
moreover, a lasting phenomenon, being in the top tier of relative spending for more than one 
decade.2 
This relative positioning derives more from the low Portuguese GDP, as when measured 







                                                 







This suggests that pressure for increasing value of consumption of pharmaceutical products will 
exist, which will be demanding due to Portugal’s relatively low ability to create wealth.  Thus, it 
comes at no surprise that several measures have been adopted in the past to control growth of 
pharmaceutical expenditures in the Portuguese market. Policy intervention has occurred at several 
levels, including price controls, barriers to enter positive lists for reimbursement and other 
measures aimed at containing pharmaceutical expenditure growth.  
Price regulation has been extensive, and follows a complicated procedure. As a first step, 
after authorization by the pharmaceutical regulatory agency, Infarmed, to introduce the new 
product into the market, the Ministry of Economy determines a maximum retail price. This 
maximum price is based on international comparisons, like in other European countries. In 
particular, currently, it is taken as the average price of the same product in four reference 
countries (France, Greece, Italy and Spain).3 Before 2005, the rule was to take the minimum price 
of three reference countries (France, Italy and Spain). Given the low prices prevailing in Greece, 
the change in the computation rule had the expectation of lowering pharmaceutical prices on 
average.  
In the case of introduction of a generic drug, the maximum price is set as 35% below the 
corresponding price of the reference branded drug. An exception occurs if the price of the 
                                                 
3 This rule was introduced by Decree-Law 65/2007, of 14th March. 
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branded drug is below 10€ in which case the maximum price for the generic drug will be 20% 
below. 
After a maximum price set by the Ministry of Economy, the Ministry of Health defines 
the maximum price for reimbursement purposes, which is necessarily equal or smaller than the 
maximum price defined by the Ministry of Economy. The reimbursement rate is not set equal to 
all products. It can take four possible values, according to how essential the product is considered. 
By September 2007, group A for reimbursement has co-insurance rate of 95% by the NHS, group 
B 69%, group C 37% and finally group D 15%. Pensioners with low incomes have additional co-
insurance rate by the NHS. Pharmaceutical products also have to face a “fourth hurdle”, that is, 
they have to show a positive cost-benefit analysis (in one of its variants, like cost-effectiveness or 
cost-utility), according to Guidelines enacted in 1999. 
The Government also decides whether, or not, the new product is included in the 
reference pricing system, created in 2003. In the reference pricing system, the reference price is 
defined based on the price of the generic product with the highest price within the defined 
homogeneous group. 
Since 2007,4 there is the possibility of an annual revision of prices set by the Ministry of 
Economy through the procedure of international comparison. The revision is not applied 
whenever the price variation is below 2.5%. In late 2005 and beginning of 2006, the Government 
has imposed a 6% decrease (each year) in the prices of pharmaceutical products. A more detailed 
description of each measure is presented below. 
We assess the impact of this stream of policy measures on aggregate pharmaceutical 
spending, using a time-series approach to endogenously detect structural breaks. Then, 
confronting the time of the break with the timetable of policy measures we identify which 
measures may be at the root of observed changes (if any). Our approach is similar, in a broad 
sense, to the works of Ong et al (2003) and Clemente et al (2007). Ong et al (2003) address the 
impact of an increase in copayments on the consumption of antidepressants, anxiolytics and 
sedatives in Sweden (during the nineties). Using the notions of spikes (one-shot changes), decays 
(a spike which vanishes gradually) and steps (permanent shifts they look for evidence of each sort 
of impact after changes in copayment levels. They find no impact from copayments raises in 1995 
and 1997 but for a women’s use reduction if antidepressants following the 1997 change Clemente 
et al. (2007) is the most recent example of aggregate, cross-country, panel data analysis related to 
pharmaceutical spending (for the earlier literature, see the references therein).  
                                                 
4 Portaria 300-A/2007 of 19 March. 
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One of the challenges resulting from their analysis is the need for a more detailed 
knowledge at the level of each country. We present here the contribution from a small European 
country, with a relatively high level of copayment in pharmaceutical consumption and a high 
frequency of policy measures. The absence of a large domestic base in innovation expenditures 
associated with new pharmaceutical products also means that the main focus of policy 





The three main series are the payments made by the NHS (enc), the total sales in value of 
pharmaceutical products (pvp) and the number of boxes sold (emb), taken as a crude proxy to the 
notion of quantity, relative to the NHS-reimbursed drugs.  In addition, we have also used overall 
market data on sales in both value and number of boxes sold (the overall market includes both 
over-the-counter and NHS-reimbursed pharmaceutical products). All the data was compiled from 
public sources and checked with Infarmed, the Portuguese regulatory authority for 
pharmaceutical products. The value series (enc and pvp) were deflated by the CPI (2002=100), to 
measure the value in terms of prices of a composite good made up of all the economy’s 
production. By NHS market we refer to the pharmaceutical products that have a fraction of the 
respective price paid by the NHS. In what follows, we will also use the series in logs (denoted as 
LENC, LEMB and LPVP). 
From Figure 3, we can observe that all three series have a very similar behaviour over 
time. The common evolution becomes even clearer when we look at the joint graph of the 
normalized series in Figure 4.  
                                                 
5 There are very few Portuguese-based pharmaceutical firms conducting R&D. The year 2009 will see the 






All the three series seem to share a similar pattern, with a steady growth up to 2005, and a 
flattening, or even decrease, in the latter part of the period. The year 2003 also appears to have 
been somewhat special. This suggests the usefulness of testing for the presence of eventual 




   
 
 
4 Structural Time Series Modelling 
In our analysis we adopt a structural time series approach as it provides a consistent framework to 
identify the different impacts of interventions in time series characterized by trends, seasonalities 
and potential non-stationary behaviours. This approach has several advantages when compared to 
others methods such as the ARIMA models. The major components of a time series, such as the 
trend or the seasonal components can be explicitly modelled and estimated. Also, the adopted 
model is general enough to allow for different types of non-stationarity. Finally, the extension to a 
multivariate framework is quite straightforward. 
The adopted statistical model allows one to decompose a time series into several 
unobserved components. The model is known as the Basic Structural Model (see Harvey, 1989) 
and considers a local linear trend with stochastic seasonality plus noise: 
 yt=µt+st+εt,  εt~NID(0,σε2) (1) 
where µt denotes the trend, st the seasonal component, and εt the irregular component. The trend 
component is stochastic and specified as:  
µt  =  µt-1+βt-1+ηt,  ηt~NID(0,ση 2),  
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βt  =  βt-1+ζt,  ζt~NID(0,σζ 2),  
where βt is the (stochastic) slope of the trend µt. The irregular component, εt, and the shocks to the 
level, ηt, and to the slope, ζt, are uncorrelated. The special case of a deterministic linear trend plus 
noise model is obtained when ση2 = σζ2 = 0. When these two variances are positive, both the trend 
level and slope are allowed to vary over time. For the seasonal component st we adopt a 
trigonometric specification allowing for a smooth seasonal process using a flexible 




with frequency λj = π j / 6, for j = 1, …, 6. The disturbances are assumed i.i.d. with a normal 
distribution with mean zero and identical variances . The parameters of this model are 
estimated by maximum likelihood by resorting to a state-space formulation and using the Kalman 
filter to estimate the unobserved components. 
The effects of interventions or structural changes due to the introduction of new policy 
measures or to changes in regulations are easily introduced in this model by adding extra 
intervention, or dummy, variables to the model: 
  (2) 
where the intervention variables , i = 1,…,K, capture different types of intervention effects. We 
consider three different types. The first case considered corresponds to an outlying observation, or 
outlier, due to the transitory and isolated effect of an intervention that has an impact in a single 
period only. In this case, the variable  is defined as a dummy variable that takes the value 1 in 
that period and the value 0 in all other periods. Another type of structural change is called a level 
change and corresponds to a shift in the level of the series occurring at some point in time and can 
be captured by defining the variable  equal to 0 before that period, and equal to 1 afterwards. 
This type of structural change can be interpreted as a transitory shock that affects the level but has 
no effect on the slope of the trend. Finally, a permanent change in the slope can be captured in our 
model by defining  as equal to 0 before the break date, which we denote as τi, and equal to (t-
τi) afterwards. Note that it is possible for a given intervention to result in several of these effects 
leading to more than one intervention variable defined for the same break date being included in 
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the model. An example is a measure that simultaneously decreases the level and the slope of a 
series at some point in time whose effect is captured by including both a level and a slope change 
intervention variable in the model. 
In our study, the number, type and location of the structural changes are determined 
endogenously, that is, they are estimated from the data itself. This is done in the following 
sequential manner. First, the basic structural model without intervention variables as in equation 
(1) is estimated. As shown in Harvey and Koopman (1992), it is possible to use the auxiliary 
residuals to identify the location and type of structural changes. The model in equation (2) is then 
estimated including all the K intervention variables that were identified. Finally, only those 
intervention variables that are significant in this re-estimated model are kept in the final model.6 
The previous model was described in a univariate setting. It is straightforward to extend it 
to a multivariate setting and to identify and estimate the time series components and intervention 
variables for a vector of time series variables (for details see Harvey, 1989, and Koopman et al, 
2007). In terms of estimated parameters, in a multivariate setting, it is necessary to consider not 
only the variances of each component’s disturbance term but the covariances/correlations 
matrices for each component vector. As in the univariate case, in this model it is also assumed 
that the level, slope, seasonal and irregular disturbances are independent. 
 
5 Estimation Results 
The Basic Structural Model allowing for structural changes defined in equation (2) was applied to 
each individual series. The estimation results appear in Table 1. The estimated standard 
deviations of the disturbances associated with each of the components suggest that the variability 
of the slope shocks ζt is relatively small implying that the slope components βt will show little 
variation across time. This is confirmed by the graph of the estimated slope components 
appearing in Figures 5-7 for each of the variables considered.  
Table 1 also presents the estimated structural changes for each variable. There is a single 
outlier detected in April 2004 for the LPVP series. However, there is evidence of the existence of 
some level shifts. Both the LENC and LPVP present a negative level shift in October 2005. For 
the LENC series, there is also evidence of a second level shift occurring in February 2007.  The 
LEMB series presents a single level shift in January 2003. None of the series presented any 
evidence of a structural change in the slope. Therefore, although all detected level shifts had a 
negative coefficient, the associated decreases in the level were of a temporary nature due to the 
fact that the trend slope has remained relatively stable and positive throughout the entire sample 
                                                 
6 All computations were done in STAMP 8 (see Koopman et al., 2007). 
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period. This aspect is also clear in Figures 5-7 by observing the plot of the sum of the level and 
the intervention components, , over time.  
The estimation results for the multivariate model are presented in Table 2. The high 
comovement in the three series is reflected in the estimated correlations of the components across 
the series being very close to 1. As in the univariate case, the variable of the slope disturbances is 
relatively small.  
The detected structural changes are also similar to the ones found in the univariate 
analysis. The early 2003 level shift is now detected for all the three series. For the LENC and the 
LPVP series, the 2005 level shifts are detected again although one month earlier. For the LEMB, 
a new level shift is detected in December 2003. The 2007 level shift in the LENC series is not 
detected because of the smaller sample size of the LEMB and LPVP series. As before, there is no 
evidence of any structural change in the trend slopes of our series. 
 
Table 1. Estimation results for the univariate models 
 LENC LEMB LPVP 
 
Components Standard Deviations 
     Level (ση) 0.0050 0.0022 0.0051 
    Slope (σζ) 0.0003 0.0004 0.0004 
    Seasonal (σω) 0.0015 0.0000 0.0005 
    Irregular (σε) 0.0307 0.0352 0.0325 
Outliers    
Date   2000:04 
Coefficient   -0.100 
(t-value)   (-2.78) 
Level Shifts    
Date 2005:10 2003:01 2005:10 
Coefficient -0.102 -0.061 -0.086 
(t-value) (-4.61) (-2.99) (-3.49) 
Date 2007:2   
Coefficient -0.090   
(t-value) (-3.88)   
Log-likelihood 454.562 373.001 373.694 
No. Observations 164 137 137 
Rs2 0.516 0.541 0.539 
 Note: t-statistics appear in parenthesis. 
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Figure 5. Estimated level+interventions  ( ) and slope (st) components for enc 









Table 2. Estimation results for multivariate model 
 LENC LEMB LPVP 
Components Standard Deviations 
     Level (ση) 0.0044 0.0064 0.0015 
    Slope (σζ) 0.0005 0.0000 0.0000 
    Seasonal (σω) 0.0012 0.0000 0.0001 
    Irregular (σε) 0.0322 0.0046 0.0000 
 
Correlation Matrices 
     Level LENC 0.651 0.940 
     LEMB - 0.762 
    
     Slope LENC 1 1 
     LEMB - 1 
    
     Seasonal LENC 1 0,996 
    LEMB - 0,996 
    
     Irregular LENC 0,990 0,999 
    LEMB - 0,995 
    
Outliers    
Date 2005:01   
Coefficient -0.007   
(t-value) (-3.45)   
Level Shifts    
Date 2003:03 2003:01 2003:03 
Coefficient -0.034 -0.023 -0.019 
(t-value) (-4.00) (-3.55) (-2.68) 
Date 2005:09 2003:12 2005:09 
Coefficient -0.045 -0.026 -0.025 
(t-value) (-4.90) (-4.11) (-3.29) 
Log-likelihood 1621.05 
No. Observations 137 
Rs2 0.547 0.538 0.539 
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4.3 Discussion 
Having the information on the structural breaks dictated by the data, we confront the results with 
the key policy measures taken during this period. In the previous section we identified the 
existence of structural breaks in October 2005 and February 2007 for the series of Government 
outlays with reimbursement of population costs with pharmaceutical products. The breaks were 
more visible in the series of Government expenditures with reimbursement of listed 
pharmaceutical products. In particular, the 2007 break does not appear in any of the two other 
series, while the 2005 break also shows up in the total sales value series but not on the number of 
boxes sold series.  When all series are taken together, the 2007 break can no longer be identified. 
Instead, an earlier break, in the first quarter of 2003 is detected. The common characteristic is the 
absence of trend changes. All structural breaks are characterized by one-time decreases in 
expenditure, with underlying economic forces, which drive the dynamics of pharmaceutical 
expenditure, being unchanged. The main measures adopted in the period covered by the series are 
described in Table 3. 
 








Changes in the copayment regime. It imposes the need  for an economic 





Changes in the copayment regime, giving 10% more in the 





Price changes: new pharmaceutical products must be at least 5% cheaper 
than existing alternatives in the market. Rules for delisting are also 
established. 
7th June, 2001 Portaria 
577/201 
Price changes, namely the rules for generic drugs’ prices (generics’ 






Establishes changes of pharmaceutical prices, with increases in most 
cases between 1.5%  (products with prices in the range 5-10€) and 5% 





It creates the reference pricing system, reinforcing the role of generic 
drugs. The reference price in each homogeneous group of 
pharmaceutical products is determined by the highest generic price). 
Further legislation connected to this piece below. The system became 





Extends the application of the Decree-Law 270/2002 (use of the 





Establishes changes in price setting for generic drugs (imposing that new 





Extends for one more year an extra co-insurance rate of 25% for generic 





It establishes the rules to be followed in the definition of boxes of 






Redefines the groups of pharmaceutical products, following the adoption 
of a new pharmacotherapeutic classification. Does not change the set of 
products covered by the NHS. 
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27th June, 2005 Portaria 
618-A/2005 
It sets an administrative price reduction of 6% in all pharmaceutical 
products. Complemented with Portaria 826/2005 of 14 September, 
about sales of existing stocks at previous prices (until 31.10.2005). 
Effective 15.10.2005. It opens an exception for products of companies 
investing more than 5M€ in R&D in Portugal. It reduces margins for 





Changes again the reimbursement system: reduces in 5% the highest co-
insurance rate of the NHS coverage of pharmaceutical products. 
Eliminates the extra coverage rate associated with generic products. It 
provides additional reimbursement coverage for the poor elderly 





Agreement between the pharmaceutical industry and the Government to 
set a ceiling for the growth of public spending with pharmaceutical 
products. If the growth of public pharmaceutical expenditure exceeds a 
limit, then a fraction of that excess is paid back by the industry. 
4th July, 2006 Decree-Law 
127/06 
Reduces from 30% to 20% the extra co-insurance rate given to generic 






Reduces the price of all pharmaceutical products included in the NHS 






Imposes a mandatory price reduction in prices of generic drugs 
whenever their market share gets above a certain threshold. Changes the 





It establishes the possibility of pharmacies giving price discounts on the 
pharmaceutical products they sell (making prices set by the Government 
maximum prices instead of fixed prices) and details reductions generic 
prices according to market share (as set by the general principle laid 
down in Decree-Law 65/07). 
 
From 1995 to 2001, we have seen a downward trend in the growth rate of pharmaceutical 
expenditure by the NHS, which has essentially levelled off after this date. This is quite clear after 
the exogenous price reductions associated with the structural breaks are reduced. This evidence 
supports the interpretation that even if total expenditure went down, the economic forces behind 
the growth of pharmaceutical expenditures have not been touched in a significant way. Therefore, 
the effect on spending even it noticeable will be temporary. The underlying sustained growth will 
take total spending levels to the previous levels in the short to medium run.  
A temporary effect in early 2003 coincides with the start of the reference pricing system. 
The effective start of the reference pricing system in March 2003 seems therefore ot be associated 
with a decrease in sales values, resulting from price adjustments of branded drugs that face 
competition from generics under the newly introduced reference pricing system. The temporary 
effect is detected in all three series (total sales, number of boxes sold – with a lead of two periods 
– and expenditures by the NHS). For a period of 6 to 9 months, overall public expenditure growth 
was reduced. However, after this adaptation period, firms were able to resume their historical 
growth of sales and NHS payments were again aligned with historical growth. Basically, our 
                                                 
7 It is now the average price of four reference countries (Spain, Italy, Greece and France). 
 18 
analysis detects only a level shift around 2003 in the series of sales values and NHS 
reimbursements. Since the underlying growth rate did not change (no break in slope), the 
historical trend resumed shortly after. Graphically, the temporary effect is clearly visible in a 
slowdown of pharmaceutical expenditures, followed by a slight acceleration that takes the series 
back to its historical path. The second break detected under the joint analysis of the three series 
(covering the period January 1995 to May 2006) occurs in September 2005, roughly coinciding 
with the first administratively determine price decrease in pharmaceutical products. Using the 
longer time series for reimbursement payments made by the NHS, running from January 1995 to 
July 2008, this last structural break is identified with October and the administrative price 
decrease of February 2007 also shows up as a structural break. The longer time series does not 
detect the (short-lived) initial impact of introduction of the reference pricing system in March 
2003.8 
From the above description of the main policy measures in the pharmaceutical market, it 
becomes clear that only two policy measures were adopted in the months prior to the structural 
breaks found:  the administrative price changes. It is also relevant to note that the change in box 
sizes, imposed to reduce waste and adjust box sizes to the therapeutic needs of patients, and the 
change in the pharmacologic groups did not have any impact on the market evolution. In addition, 
the series on boxes sold (emb) does not show any noticeable structural break. We therefore need 
to look for other policy measures that either take a longer time to produce effects, or that have 
reinforced the initial impetus produced by the box-sizes law. 
The introduction of the reference pricing system apparently had temporary impact on 
growth of pharmaceutical sales during 2003, which seems to have been countervailed by early 
2004. However, the reference pricing system, with its regular price update and entry of new 
products, is still a candidate to explain the trend change.  
During 2005, the more emblematic measure was the 6% administrative price reduction, 
adopted in June and effective in September 2005, a measure repeated in late 2006, effective in 
early 2007. These administrative price reductions had an important impact. However, a change in 
the price level of all pharmaceutical products should result in a reduction of payments by both the 
NHS and the patients. Since a trend reversal is identified in the overall sales series (pvp) in 2005 
(but not in 2007), this remains a candidate to be the main driving force behind the structural 
                                                 
8 We were not able to obtain longer time series for the number of boxes and total sales corresponding to the 
pharmaceutical products reimbursed by the NHS. Instead, more recent data only have information on both 
value and boxes total market sales (which includes pharmaceutical products not in the list the NHS) and 
NHS reimbursement payments. Using the same procedure on these three series, running from July 2003 to 
July 2008, no effect is detected, as randomness of the series seems to be too high for detection of structural 
breaks. Details are available from the authors upon request. 
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break. It is actually interesting to note that pharmaceutical companies were able to sustain growth 
in sales at a pace broadly in line with the historic trend. Since no systematic change in the 
“quantity” measure (number of boxes sold) took place, the ability to keep sales growth is 
conjectured to be the result of a composition effect: a move in sales from relatively low-price 
drugs to high-priced ones after the 2007 administratively determined price decrease. The level of 
aggregation we have available in the data, we cannot probe further. This is an issue left for future 
research. 
It is also apparent that such measures created only a level effect, as the underlying 
dynamics (growth rate) did not change in a substantive way, once we remove the discrete effect 
of the 6% price reduction across the board. 
Importantly, the agreement with the pharmaceutical industry to contain public 
expenditure, signed in February 2006, may have created a general mood for marketing efforts of 
pharmaceutical companies favouring control of public expenditure growth, and does not seem to 
have helped to sustain it as a trend reversal. 
Since the agreement focus solely on the public expenditure side, one may anticipate a 
reaction of pharmaceutical companies emphasizing their products with lower reimbursement from 
the NHS (as this would it make easier to be under the ceiling). Since other measures, adopted 
during this period, increased patients’ share, we may have a first look at their role. The number of 
statistical observations is still too short to make proper tests. Nonetheless, Figure 8 is suggestive 
of the shift of costs from the NHS to patients’, implying that the change was stronger in payments 
made by the NHS.9 The simple price reduction does not account for this phenomenon in a 
complete way. Unfortunately, we do not have recent data on the NHS market total sales to assess 
recent evolution. 
 
                                                 
9 The ratio used, total NHS reimbursements of pharmaceutical products over total sales, does not 
distinguish changes in the share of NHS-covered products in total market and changes in the average 
reimbursement rate in NHS-covered pharmaceuticals. The size (total sales) of the NHS-covered 
pharmaceutical products is not publicly known for more recent years. For a couple of years, both pieces of 
information were available, and the evolution NHS reimbursements over total sales and over NHS-covered 
total sales was similar. 
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Figure 8: Reimbursement in the NHS relative to total sales 
 
 
5 Final remarks 
Many policy measures aimed at containing the expenditure with pharmaceutical products have 
been adopted in Portugal during the last ten years, similar to what was a general approach in 
many other countries. Using a time-series approach we let the data speak and identify 
endogenously breaks in the series of expenditure growth. The identified break points were then 
compared with the timetable of policy measures. 
We can identify a transitory impact in the first half of 2003 coinciding with the start of 
the reference pricing system. However, the slowdown in the payments by the NHS on 
pharmaceutical products was relatively short lived. Before the end of the year, growth of 
pharmaceutical expenditure had returned to the historical path. The statistical model does not 
capture it as a structural break 
The two structural breaks detected occur circa October 2005 and January 2007. The 
timing of the structural break does coincide with two measures in the prior months: the 
administratively determined price reductions in pharmaceutical products. However, Government 
determined price decreases have only a level effect. The underlying dynamics do not have 
changed. Accordingly, pharmaceutical companies were able to keep roughly historical growth 
trends, with measures resulting mainly in a shift of the financial burden from the NHS to patients.  
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Our findings, based on the evolution of aggregate times series of pharmaceutical 
expenditure, do raise further questions, namely about the mechanisms by which firms adjust to 
policy measures. Taking again the discussion of Mossialos et al (2006), our results corroborate 
their view that creating competition from generics and an active role when defining 
reimbursement values for patented drugs is necessary for third-party payers to control 
pharmaceutical spending.  Still, so far, there is no evidence of a sufficient policy tool, able to keep 
under control pharmaceutical spending. However, pharmaceutical companies’ adjustment may 
make it just a mater of shifting financial burdens and not one of fundamental change in 
consumption patterns. Confirmation of this conjecture and identification of the demand factors 
and the instruments used by pharmaceutical companies that sustain consumption growth, despite 
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